Rationality from Trump to the Islamic Republic
Why judging reason without understanding context is misleading
Last week we came from Antalya to Germany to spend the New Year with my partner’s family. A few days later, heavy snow fell. We were stuck outside, the bus was late, and I—wearing inappropriate clothes, in the wrong place, standing in the middle of a bus stop—was practically freezing. That was where our discussion began; a discussion about the word Vernunft, a term Kant was particularly fond of and that is usually translated as “reason.”
The discussion started when sentences like these began appearing in my mind, one after another:
“Don’t you have any sense, coming here dressed like that?”
I tried to understand exactly in what situations German speakers use this word and what they mean by it. Gradually, a picture formed in my mind: if, in the middle of recording a serious podcast, I suddenly started dancing, most people would probably think I had gone mad or lost my reason. But if I did exactly the same thing at a wedding, such an interpretation would not arise.
What we usually overlook is not reason itself, but context. Our focus is often on a specific action or statement, not on the setting in which that action acquires meaning. Rationality, contrary to common belief, is not an intrinsic property of behavior; it is a relation between behavior and the context that makes it intelligible or absurd.
Trump is appealing to many people and appears “irrational” to many others—not necessarily because of what he says, but because he dances where seriousness is expected. He is unpredictable because he plays on a field that does not align with our established expectations. The issue is not whether he has reason or lacks it; the issue is that he acts within a different framework, and that very framework disrupts our judgment.
At this point, the main question is no longer what reason is or what counts as rational. The question is: who or what determines this context? Who decides that one should not dance in the middle of a podcast, or that in a presidential speech one should not speak like a clown and make people laugh?
Is the answer obvious?
Not at all. My answer is this:
Culture, social norms, educational systems, power structures, and a network of established expectations that заранее determine what will appear “reasonable.”
In political and philosophical discussions, beyond these factors, context is shaped by discursive systems, systems of meaning, and ideological frameworks. This is precisely where, in Invisible Borders, I have referred to what I call the chains of rationality—where reason, instead of being a tool for understanding, turns into a mechanism for discipline, boundary-making, and rapid judgment. A rationality that, instead of seeing, excludes.
These variables are so fluid and context-dependent that one cannot freeze them at any moment and say, “this is rationality.” And yet, every day we hear claims like “Trump has no reason!” or “the Islamic Republic lacks rationality.” But is that really the issue? Or do they exist within different contexts—contexts in which this kind of action and behavior is not a sign of irrationality, but the logical outcome of the very chains we call rationality?
When I was in the twenty-five-degree weather of Antalya, I truly could not imagine the minus-fifteen-degree cold here. The issue was not merely a difference of context; the issue was that I was fundamentally incapable of constructing a mental model of that difference. Of course, even if I had been able to, it would not have made much difference—because in practice I did not have more suitable clothes with me.
If we extend this inability to construct a mental model from the level of personal experience to the level of politics, the picture becomes clearer. Many of the judgments we make about Trump or the Islamic Republic arise not from analysis, but from our inability to understand the context in which those actions have taken shape. From within the twenty-five-degree weather of our own Antalya, we pass judgment on the minus-fifteen-degree cold of another world—and then we are surprised when those judgments fail to work.


